The Other Domino Effect

The Other Domino Effect John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon did not define the importance of fighting communism in Vietnam in the same way. Each individual ascended to power at very different periods of U.S. involvement in the conflict, inheriting pressures ranging from omnipotent national theories and verbal commitments (i.e., the Kennedy administration) to tangible large-scale U.S. involvement (e.g., the Johnson administration and even more so the Nixon …

…immediate and certain defeat. Each man never gave up the hope that the South’s government would solidify long enough to fight for their own “freedom,” allowing a U.S. departure from what had evolved into an undesirable position. Throughout this conflict two domino effects determined our involvement: the misguided Domino Theory, which planted its roots deep into American pride; and the domino effect of escalation that grew from these red, white and blue roots.