Moral Truth in Emotivism and the Social Convention Theory

Ethical theory aspies to an articulation of the principles and motivations underlying our intuitive moral judgements. A sufficient theory must, therefore, account for the character of morality as we view it. We regard morality as aspiring to truth, and our intuition dictates that our moral judgements are at least sometimes true. We speak of morality as involving some degree of universality within the whole of humanity or within society. Philosopher Gilbert Harman presents emotivism as …

…not seem to provide the underlying universal truth we seek. While moral judgement constitute more than subjective emotional responses, each person must choose which group to join and which set of conventions to accept. The social convention theory does not provide a single true morality. Moralities are relative to frameworks. The universal truth we conceive of is not relative to frameworks. Thus it appears we must conclude that the theory of social convention is flawed.